By Pamela Bartar and Gábor Szüdi, Zentrum für Soziale Innovation The sudden outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic – to give an example that affected all our lives – was a drastic reminder of the importance of science communication. Scientists and researchers, policymakers, journalists or media and citizens etc. can attest that measures to contain the spread of the virus will only be socially accepted if the communication between these stakeholders is effective. To increase the likelihood that quality scientific findings and advice are taken into consideration during the policy-making process, science communication can play an important role. Tackling the need to strengthen scientists and researchers being important voices of evidence, TRESCA produced an online survey for scientists and recently finished analysing the results this online survey about scientists’ motivations to engage with scholarly communication (or science inreach) and in science communication (science outreach) addressed to public, politics, media or further stakeholders. These findings will now open a conversation about ways to align current incentives to foster academic and scientific excellence with new methods and instruments better able to acknowledge the important social role science and scientific information plays in current times. Figure 1: Example of participant recruitment through Twitter By analysing the results of the TRESCA online survey on the “Engagement in Science Communication Across Europe”, which was aimed to scientists and researchers from all disciplines during the summer in 2020 and complemented by desk research on four academic contexts including Austria, Hungary, Spain and the Netherlands, two major narratives on (pre-)conditions became visible. Considering these fundamental feedbacks gained by the TRESCA survey, the conclusions in this blog offer a set of starting points for better science communication, especially to improve conditions and infrastructure for young scientists and beyond an early phase of their career. In figure 2, an overview of respondents per country is shown. Figure 2: Survey respondents of per country (%) Lack of Time as Main Culprit?The present incentive systems still strongly rely on scientific publications as a measure of scientific excellence. And despite its importance, a “lack of time” and “resources” to communicate these findings to non-academic audiences limits the capacity of science to produce a positive effect on society. Some disadvantaged groups, such as female scientists and young scholars, can feel pressured to demonstrate their scientific excellence and be discouraged from engaging in important science communication outreach activities. From the survey results, it’s interesting to note that financial support does not seem to be an important factor to engage with science communication. Figure 3: Main challenges and reasons for NOT participating in science communication according to the survey respondents Balancing Scientific and Societal (Impetus and) ImpactTo further elaborate, not only the excellence of science, but the impact of science on society needs to be better acknowledged alongside the career of a scientist and during the PhD training process. For example, taking public relations and communication courses during the PhD can greatly improve a scientist’s self-confidence and communication effectiveness, which are transferable skills that are always useful. Regarding indicators of scientists’ engagement with outreach science communication activities, it is important to remember that in the current digital media environment, these information are already available and considered in the elaboration of altmetrics indicators under development, and that are trying to improve accuracy of more traditional scientometric indicators. Intensifying Public Engagement Through Interactive Science CommunicationMore interactive forms of science outreach could be beneficial and help scientists and citizens (and other stakeholders) to collaborate better with each other. Seemingly less known- and more expensive – science outreach formats such as science festivals and cafés, and specific types of citizen science engagement projects (putting a focus on those projects involving citizens not only as data collectors), if promoted, could help satisfy the need of researchers for higher visibility and feedback about the relevance and impact of their research. Female Power for Science Communication and Societal Impact NeededFemale scientists were perceived as a underrepresented group in science communication, was the finding in the TRESCA study. Although of course, the visibility of women in science and academia also depends on the field. Many respondents mentioned that women get some visibility only after reaching a certain level, generally higher career position, which is a problem that affects young female researchers. Based on the TRESCA findings, women tend to give less importance to science outreach than men, which could lead to their early research success going unnoticed. The underlying (institutional, scientific, cultural) reason of this phenomenon should be explored and tackled: if women realise early on the value of science communication and participate in science outreach more frequently and successfully. This might help to break the “glass ceiling” in certain countries and scientific fields and offer role models to young girls and motivate them to learn more about science. From a future of science standpoint, we may claim that the problem of a limited visibility for young researchers, women in particular, bring several drawbacks. Having more young researchers active in science communication outreach activities would help increase the scientific literacy and bring awareness of science to younger generations, who would feel more empowered by seeing role models. To compensate activities in outreach, one example of good science communication is prizes and awards that could be given on a merit basis to CVs of early career scientists.
By Giuseppe Pellegrini, Observa Science in Society Since the beginning and the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic across the world, it has been clear how a wave of misinformation has spread fake news and hoaxes proven difficult to fight. One of the numerous problems has regarded media and newspapers in particular, unable to communicate in the most comprehensible and concise way fundamental contents to readers. The kind of content that could have led people through fear and uncertainty of the present: uncountable photos, video and articles reported on the media without a proper fact checking have contributed creating a distrust attitude among people. Is this the way journalists and communicators are meant to deal with, in what is probably the most difficult time after since World War II? As pointed out by M. Bucchi, a good emergency and risk communication practice can help society address the “new coronavirus” crisis. Citizens must be able to (easily) find the most important and necessary information updated on official communication channels in an easy (and efficiently) manner (institutional websites of the Ministry of Health and Education or of the Regions, social media platforms etc.) Whose task is this, who has the responsibility to manage the communication at an institutional level? This should / could be emergency and risk communication professionals rather than marketers or press officers. The chosen media doesn’t have to be a personal Facebook page or a twitter account: always go official, institutional. (or: the chosen media to run communication through should not be FB or Twitter, but rather and always through official and institutional platforms) An open eye on what happens in different countries Assessing the current situation: several countries around the world are investigating the perception of public opinion about pandemic communication. What is happening in Sweden is demonstrated through an ongoing VA survey about the public confidence in researchers and public figures. “The ongoing pandemic presents major challenges for society. Communication is a crucial factor in the response to these challenges. Individuals, organisations and countries are all faced with making many decisions based on a limited but growing evidence base.” Fig. 1: VA (Public & Science) is conducting a real-time study, in collaboration with researchers at the Karolinska Institute and Södertörn University to understand how people receive and interpret information about the current pandemic. According to Secretary General of VA (Public and Science), Cissi Askwall “the public has had a great deal of confidence in health care professionals and researchers, and a much lower confidence in politicians and journalists. In Sweden, we also have great confidence in our authorities and public institutions, especially universities and university colleges. […] The ongoing crisis shows that good science communication can make a big difference. I hope this means that communication will be higher on the agenda in the research world in the long term.” A recent survey (April 2020) from Pew Research Center shows how the percentage of Americans who say journalists have exaggerated the risks of the outbreak has decreased notably. Fig. 2: Pew Research Center – Share of Americans saying media have exaggerated the risks of COVID-19 declined from March to April. Italian citizens and COVID-19 information communication Fig. 3: Italian citizens and three attitudes towards COVID-19 communication Thanks to a cluster analysis made on data collected in April by Observa – Science in Society, it is possible to identify and divide in three groups Italian citizens and their actual trust towards information sources: Institutional optimist (43%) – the one that trusts and informs himself/herself mainly through television news and institutional web channels. Considers positively both the communication work of the principal institutions and the role of scientific experts; thinks that effective solutions will soon come from science.Confused (35%) – isn’t able to express an opinion neither on the work nor on the quality of communication by the institutions. Searches for news on the media, from family and friends; the variety of experts drives him/her confused and has no high expectations when it comes to finding pandemic solutions.Social Pessimist (22%) – his/her position about actions and communication by the institutions is mainly negative. He/she relies more on people and social media news about the pandemic and criticizes the way scientists communicate and is pessimistic about a solution against coronavirus in a short time. Concluding, communication surrounding COVID-19 is met with challenges. Bill Hanage and Marc Lipsitch highlight the responsibility of scientists and journalists: “Emergencies like this one lead to extreme pressure on both scientists and journalists to be the first with news. We have a common responsibility to protect public health. The virus does not read news articles and doesn’t care about Twitter.”
By Sara Degli Esposti and Turkay Nefes, CSIC If you believe that powerful people intentionally produced the coronavirus epidemic[i] you are not alone: in fact some surveys suggest one in four people in the US think the same. Many Americans also agree with those who think 5G technology is responsible for the spreading of SARS-Cov-2, that Stella Immanuel, who said that hydroxychloroquine is the cure to Covid19, is more credible than Dr Anthony Fauci and the American Medical Association, and that the US government is partly run by non-human reptilians. After all, believing in that a bunch of powerful people (the conspirators) are acting in secret for their own benefit against the interest of the people, people like you, is such a reasonable and powerful explanation and there is significant evidence confirming it! Increasingly, these conspiracy-based views are evident across Europe and more globally as well. Conspiracy theories are powerful because they offer a very vague and, thus, flexible and adaptable causal explanation that can work well in many circumstances. For example, it fits well when we try to explain global warfare and geopolitical dynamics we know nothing about. Conspiracy theories are flexible in nature because the role of the conspirator can always be assigned to the group we dislike the most. For example, when key people in the United States government accuse the Chinese government of attempting to hack the research groups working on Covid-19 (BBC 2020)[ii], it can be used to say that the Chinese government is conspiring against the world, or it can equally be said that the American government is making up this story to cover other things they don’t want you to know. People can interpret the same message in opposite ways depending on their previous beliefs. We have a general tendency to seek out, favourably evaluate, and preferentially remember information that is congruent with our existing attitudes and beliefs, while being distrustful of evidence that runs counter to one’s attitudes and beliefs. The observation that individuals prefer consonant cognitions, developed as part of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957)[iii] is indicative of an important idea called “selective exposure”. Selective exposure refers to the act of choosing to read or view belief-consistent information over belief-inconsistent information (when given the choice). In simple terms, everyone has a tendency to prefer communication channels and retain information that confirms what they already know. In the digital environment this tendency is reinforced by automated recommendation systems that may push us into filter bubbles or informational cocoons. The problem with filter bubbles is that decision-making is more likely to be flawed when individuals only select and retain information that are compatible with their existing worldview. However, these can be inconsistent with (most) empirical evidence and (most) expert interpretations. The problem becomes especially acute when people are looking for information to make informed decisions. In health decision-making and in the adoption of recommended behaviours[iv], seeking and acquiring accurate information is very relevant. When conspiracy theories are applied to scientific results, people may be misguided and interpret information in the wrong way. Scientific misinformation produced as part of these wrong interpretations may have widespread and detrimental effects on the society. Previous studies on the relationship between conspiracy theories and scientific knowledge have investigated climate change (e.g., Douglas, and Sutton 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2015)[v], AIDS (the acquired immune deficiency syndrome) (e.g. Ford et al., 2012; Hogg et al., 2015),[vi] and vaccination (e.g. Jolley, and Douglas 2014).[vii] All of them warn about the harmful impact of conspiracy theories. Jolley and Douglas (2014) found that conspiracy theories about climate change lower people’s intention to reduce carbon print.[viii] Conspiracy beliefs about AIDS seem to constitute a barrier to prevention, and are associated with increased odds for having unprotected intercourse (Bogart, and Thorburn 2005; Grebe, and Natrass 2011)[ix] and non-adherence with medical treatment (Bogart et al., 2010).[x] Moreover, Jolley and Douglas (2014) provided evidence that people show less intention to get vaccinated if they were exposed to material supporting anti-vaccination conspiracy theories.[xi] So, who is more vulnerable to conspiracy theories? It seems that people who tend to adopt conspiratorial thinking show psychological traits such as delusional ideation (Dagnall et al 2015)[xii], boredom proneness (Brotherton, and Eser 2015)[xiii], and stress (Swami et al 2016)[xiv]. Uscinski and co-authors (2020)[xv] reported that general conspiratorial thinking, along with the psychological predisposition to reject authoritative information (denialism) and partisan motivations, are the most significant predictors of conspiracy beliefs about Covid-19. These findings are consistent to those of other studies, which show partisanship and ideological motivations along with conspiracy theories are statistically significant factors explaining climate science denial (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, and Gignac 2013; Uscinski, and Olivella 2017).[xvi] Lobato and co-authors (2014)[xvii] present evidence of a significant overlap among university students between believing in paranormal, conspiracy theories and pseudoscience claims in their study on the association of epistemically unwarranted beliefs. Some scholars even deem the spreading of conspiracy theories as a cultural phenomenon. In their view, conspiracy beliefs respond to a need. The need to make sense of and react to a complex social and political reality when searching of explanations[xviii]. Other scholars see conspiracy theories more as irrational accounts, which signal social or political pathologies of marginal groups and the prevention of these groups from understanding the nature of events[xix]. Endorsing conspiratorial views is associated with political and institutional mistrust and, thus, with social instability[xx]. Other academic studies foreground additional negative effects such as: lower levels of prosocial behaviour (van der Linden 2015)[xxi] and depoliticisation (Butler, Koopman, and Zimbardo 1995; Fenster 1999);[xxii] justification of intergroup hatred (Cohn 2005)[xxiii] and damages to internal organisational dynamics and co-workers’ cooperation (Van Prooijen, and De Vries 2016);[xxiv] and lower levels of trust in science and in the government (Bogart, and Thorburn 2015; Einstein, and Glick 2015)[xxv]. However, there are a few studies that identified positive consequences of conspiracy theories (e.g. Newheiser, Farias, and Tausch 2011).[xxvi] One of which is Roisman (2006)[xxvii], who argues that a rhetoric of conspiracy helped Athenians in Ancient Greece through the externalisation of their enemies.; Typically, it is not very good sign for a State to have a large proportion of its citizens believing that a bunch of powerful conspirators is acting against their interest – whether they are reptilians or not! Considering the global impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the emergence of conspiracy theories around it (Pinsker 2020),[xxviii] it is important to recognise and understand the mechanics of conspiratorial thinking in order to limit its spreading. Goertzel (2010, 494)[xxix] stated that conspiracy theories could lead to tragic consequences for society by undermining the credibility of sciences, as they “can be used as a rhetorical device to appeal to the emotions of a significant public.” He recommended that scientists should avoid discussions with conspiracy theorists and be aware of best practices in fighting misinformation. When correcting inaccurate scientific beliefs, it is important to provide factual alternatives to the inaccurate information we want retracted. More good advice is to avoid repeating the content of inaccurate messages to minimise detrimental memory and retrieval effects. A good counter-misinformation strategy is to offer factual alternatives to misinformation, especially alternative causal explanations of the event to fill the gap left by the misinformation. Additionally, fostering scepticism and leading people towards self-affirming corrections by means of educational tools for refuting misinformation are good strategies. Warnings at the time of the initial exposure to misinformation is also useful (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook. 2012).[xxx] Scepticism can reduce misinformation effects, as it leads to more cognitive resources being allocated to the task of weighing up the veracity of both the misinformation and the correction. The alternative explanation must be plausible, account for the important causal qualities in the initial report, and, ideally, explain why the misinformation was thought to be correct in the first place. These are the starting points to reducing conspiratorial tendencies and help reinforce potentials for a well-informed public. Footnotes [i]https://www.journalism.org/2020/06/29/most-americans-have-heard-of-the-conspiracy-theory-that-the-covid-19-outbreak-was-planned-and-about-one-third-of-those-aware-of-it-say-it-might-be-true/ [ii] “Coronavirus: US Accuses China of Hacking Coronavirus Research.” BBC, May 14, 2020. [iii] Festinger, Leon. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Vol. 2. Stanford university press, 1957. [iv] Lee, M., Ju, Y., & You, M. (2019). “The Effects of Social Determinants on Public Health Emergency Preparedness Mediated by Health Communication: The 2015 MERS Outbreak in South Korea”. Health communication, 1-11. [v] Karen Douglas and Robbie Sutton. “Climate Change: Why the Conspiracy Theories are Dangerous.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 2 (2015): 98–106; Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Klaus Oberauer, Scott Brophy, Elisabeth Lloyd, and Michael Marriott. “Recurrent Fury: Conspiratorial Discourse in the Blogosphere Triggered by Research on the Role of Conspiracist Ideation in Climate Denial.” Journal of Social and Political Psychology 3, no.1 (2015): 142–78. [vi] Chandra Ford, Steven Wallace, Peter Newman, Sung-Jae Lee, and William Cunningham. “Belief in AIDS-Related Conspiracy Theories and Mistrust in the Government: Relationship with HIV Testing among at-risk Older Adults.” The Gerontologist 53, no. 6 (2013): 973–84; Robert Hogg, Bosisiwe Nkala, Janan Dietrich, Alexandra Collins, Kalysha Closson, Zishan Cui, Steve Kanters, Jason Chia, Bernard Barhafuma, Alexis Palmer, Angela Kaida, Glenda Gray and Carrie Miller. “Conspiracy Beliefs and Knowledge about HIV Origins among Adolescents in Soweto. South Africa.” PLOS ONE 12, no. 2 (2017), e0165087. [vii] Daniel Jolley and Karen Douglas. “The Effects of Anti-vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions.” PLoS ONE 9, no. 2 (2014), e89177. [viii] Daniel Jolley and Karen Douglas. “The Social Consequences of Conspiracism: Exposure to Conspiracy Theories Decreases Intentions to Engage in Politics and to Reduce One’s Carbon Footprint.” British Journal of Psychology 105, no. 1 (2014): 35–56. [ix] Laura Bogart and Sheryl Thorburn. “Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention among African Americans?” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 38, no. 2 (2005): 213–8; Eduard Grebe, and Nicoli Nattrass. “AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs and Unsafe Sex in Cape Town.” AIDS and Behavior 16, no. (2012): 761–73. [x] Laura Bogart, Glenn Wagner, Frank Galvan, and Denedria Banks. “Conspiracy Beliefs about HIV are Related to Antiretroviral Treatment Nonadherence among African American Men with HIV.” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 53, no. 5 (2010), 648–55. [xi] Daniel Jolley and Karen Douglas. “The Effects of Anti-vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions.” PLoS ONE 9, no. 2 (2014), e89177. [xii] Neil Dagnall, Kenneth Drinkwater, Andrew Parker, Andrew Denovan, and Megan Parton. “Conspiracy Theory and Cognitive Style: A Worldview.” Frontiers in Psychology 6, (February 2015): 1-9. [xiii] Rob Brotherton and Silan Eser. “Bored to Fears: Boredom Proneness, Paranoia, and Conspiracy Theories.” Personality and Individual Differences 80, no. (July 2015): 1–5. [xiv] Viren Swami, Adrian Furnham, Nina Smyth, Laura Weis, Alixe Lay, Angela Clow. “Putting the Stress on Conspiracy Theories: Examining Associations between Psychological Stress, Anxiety, and Belief in Conspiracy Theories.” Personality and Individual Differences 99, (September 2016): 72–76. [xv] Joseph Uscinski, Adam Enders, Casey Klofstad, Michelle Seelig, John Funchion, Caleb Everett, Stephan Wuchty, Kamal Premaratne, and Manohar Purthi. (2020) “Why Do People Believe COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories?” The Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review 1, (2020). [xvi] Stephan Lewandowsky, Gilles Gignac, and Klaus Oberauer. “The Role of Conspiracist Ideation and Worldviews in Predicting Rejection of Science.” PLoS ONE 8, no. 10 (2013), e75637; Joseph Uscinski, and Santiago Olivella. (2017). “The Conditional Effect of Conspiracy Thinking on Attitudes toward Climate Change.” Research & Politics (2017): 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017743105 [xvii] Emilio Lobato, Jorge Mendoza, Valerie Sims, and Matthew. “Examining the Relationship Between Conspiracy Theories, Paranormal Beliefs, and Pseudoscience Acceptance Among a University Population.” Applied Cognitive Psychology 28, no. 5 (2014): 617–25. [xviii] Peter Knight, Conspiracy Culture: From the Kennedy Assassination to the X-Files (London: Routledge, 2000). [xix] Jovan Byford, Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). Rob Brotherton, Suspicious Minds: Why We Believe Conspiracy Theories (London: Bloomsbury, 2015 [xx] Turkay Salim Nefes. “The Impacts of the Turkish Government’s Conspiratorial Framing about the Gezi Park Protests.” Social Movement Studies 16, no. 5 (2017): 610-22; Turkay Salim Nefes. ‘Scrutinizing impacts of conspiracy theories on readers’ political views: a rational choice perspective on anti-Semitic rhetoric in Turkey’, British Journal of Sociology 66, no. 3 (2015): 557-75; Turkay Salim Nefes. “Rationale of Conspiracy Theorizing: Who Shot the President Chen Shui-bian?” Rationality and Society 26, no. 3 (2014): 373-94. [xxi] Sander van der Linden S “The Conspiracy-effect: Exposure to Conspiracy Theories (about Global Warming) Decreases Pro-social Behavior and Science Acceptance.” Personality and Individual Differences 87, (2015): 171–3. [xxii] Lisa Butler, Cheryl Koopman, and Philip Zimbardo. “The Psychological Impact of Viewing the Film “JFK”: Emotions, Beliefs, and Political Behavioural Intentions.” Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (1995): 237-57; Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). [xxiii] Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of Elders of Zion (London: Serif, 2005). [xxiv] Jan-Willem van Prooijen, and Reinout de Vries. “Organizational Conspiracy Beliefs: Implications for Leadership Styles and Employee Outcomes.” Journal of Business and Psychology 31, (2016): 479-91. [xxv] Laura Bogart and Sheryl Thorburn. “Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention among African Americans?” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 38, no. 2 (2005): 213–8; Katherine Einstein KL and David Glick. “Do I think BLS Data are BS? The Consequences of Conspiracy Theories.” Political Behaviour 37, no. 3 (2015): 679–701. [xxvi] Anna-Kaisa Newheiser, Miguel Farias, Nicole Tausch. “The Functional Nature of Conspiracy Beliefs: Examining the Underpinnings of Belief in the Da Vinci Code Conspiracy.” Personality and Individual Differences 51, (2011): 1007–11. [xxvii] Joseph Roisman, The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). [xxviii] Joe Pinsker. “If Someone Shares the ‘Plandemic’ Video, How Should You Respond?” The Atlantic, May 9, 2020. [xxix] Ted Goertzel. “Conspiracy Theories in Science.” EMBO Reports 11, no .7 (2010): 493–9. [xxx] Lewandowsky, Stephan, Ullrich KH Ecker, Colleen M Seifert, Norbert Schwarz, and John Cook. 2012. ‘Misinformation and its correction: Continued influence and successful debiasing’, Psychological science in the public interest, 13: 106-31.
When did you realise that your life had changed completely because of SARS-CoV-2? Was it in March 2020? Or perhaps April? We found that for most people it depends a lot on where they were based.